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ARGUMENT 
Defendant did not waive her right to argue the 
constitutionality of the inventory search in this case. Defendant 
asserted the unconstitutionality of the search in her written 
Motion to Suppress. Defendant reasserted the argument in the 
hearing on the Motion to Suppress. Specifically on pages 28-30 of 
the transcript of the hearing, counsel for defendant makes the 
following statements: 
COURT: Ms. Lachmar, anything further? 
MS. LACHMAR: I just want to point out that as I was writing 
this memorandum I was searching for a statutory basis for the 
inventory. In other words, some kind of statutory authority given 
to police officers to remove this vehicle. It seems to me there 
ought to be something on the books that says something about 
traffic accidents, that says if a car has been in an accident, is 
disabled, and the driver is removed, that there ought to be 
something in writing that they need to remove those vehicles, but 
I could find nothing. (T. 28) 
"What I wanted to point out was that as I was searching for 
something in writing to show that the police officers in this 
instance were required to remove the vehicle, I had difficulty 
finding anything. As I laid out everything that I could think of, 
as you know, the officers justified the search as pursuant to a DUI 
arrest. And as I pointed out, that couldn!t have been the basis. 
Then I looked in other places, statutory and otherwise, to 
find a basis for the inventory and was unable to come up with 
anything, except for the possible exception of their own 
regulations, which say you can remove it in an emergency situation 
to protect the vehicle, I believe. But that had no statutory 
support for it. 
So I think in this case, what the Supreme Court has said in 
other instances, particularly in State vs. Hygh and so forth, that 
if there is no statutory basis for the inventory, you then need to 
look at the circumstances and say was it justified based on the 
circumstances that existed here. So thatfs what we1re looking at. 
Just on the circumstances, were they justified in inventorying the 
vehicle? That's what the court needs to look at. 
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As I pointed out, I think that what Hygh says, and I'm not 
sure that Lopez undoes this, is that you can't conduct an inventory 
search for purely investigatory reasons. If you're doing an 
inventory search you have to have a legitimate basis for it. 
that's what I was having trouble finding is what was their 
legitimate basis for the inventory search statutorily. I couldn't 
find anything. So I guess that court would have to find that there 
was a justification for it under the circumstances in order to hold 
for the State in this case." (T. 30) pages 30-31. 
At the close of the hearing, defense counsel discusses the 
issue of the inventory search, stating again that she could find no 
legitimate statutory basis for the search and indicating that the 
Court would have to find a circumstantial basis for upholding the 
search. Defendant did not knowingly, intelligently and 
affirmatively waive the defense by making an equivocal statement at 
one point in her oral argument. She re-asserted the claim in the 
oral argument, as well as in her written motion to suppress and her 
appellate court brief. 
THE INVENTORY SEARCH WAS UNLAWFUL BECAUSE 
THERE WAS NO STATUTORY BASIS FOR AN IMPOUND AND 
SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES DID NOT JUSTIFY 
A WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S 
VEHICLE 
The State cites State V. Sterger, 808 P. 2d 122 (Utah App. 
1991) as providing a precedence for the inventory search in this 
case. However, in Sterger, the vehicle was impounded and remained 
in police custody for the following reasons: 
"Defendant's car was partially blocking the road in a remote 
area where the accident occurred. The front windshield was 
shattered and the car inoperable. All of the occupants had been 
taken for medical attention and Draper had no opportunity to ask 
defendant what he wanted done with the car. '(T)he existence or 
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absence of justification for the impoundment of an automobile may 
be determined from the surrounding circumstances.11 State v. 
Johnson, 745 P.2d 452, 454 (Utah 1987)'" In the instant case, 
defendant told the officers what she wanted done with her vehicle. 
She indicated that she wanted it turned over to her father or to 
her friend who owned a towing service in Honeyville. The vehicle 
was completely off of the roadway in a barrow pit. There is no 
indication that the vehicle was inoperable. The officer in this 
case did not impound the vehicle until after searching its 
contents. He did not impound the vehicle, because no facts existed 
at that point in time which would have justified an impound. 
"In order to support a findng that a valid inventory search has 
taken place, the court must first determine whether there was 
reasonable and proper justification for the impoundment of the 
vehicle." State v. Rice 717 P.2d 695, 696 (Utah 1986). "Absent a 
statutory basis justifying impoundment, we look to the totality of 
the surrounding circumstances to determine the reasonableness of 
the seizure of the vehicle." Rice at 696. In holding for the 
defendant in Rice at 696 the Court stated as follows: 
"Cache County has no written standards or procedures for 
police impoundment of motor vehicles. It is undisputed that 
defendant's truck was safely locked and parked in a parking lot 
behind a law office. There is no evidence that there the vehicle 
posed any danger to the officers or the public. Defendant was not 
permitted to have someone pick up his locked truck from the parking 
lot or to arrange other disposition. Defendant was neither advised 
of the search in advance nor allowed an opportunity to be present." 
Likewise in the instant case, defendant was not advised of the 
search in advance nor allowed an opportunity to be present. 
Defendant's vehicle was in a barrow pit, adjacent to a county road 
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and did not pose any danger to the officers or the public. 
Defendant was attempting to make arrangements for disposition of 
the vehicle as she was being taken away by ambulance. She wanted 
the car turned over to her father or a friend of hers who operated 
a towing service in Honeyville. She had no idea the officers 
intended to search her car or that requesting a tow truck, 
effectively constituted a consent to search. 
Further, there was no emergency requiring removal of the 
vehicle. It was not obstructing traffic and it could have been 
locked in order to secure its contents. An inventory search may 
only be conducted "...if the officers conduct an inventory search 
of a properly impounded vehicle, in good faith, following 
reasonable, standardized police procedures." State v. Gray 851 
P.2d (Utah App 1993) As stated in a footnote to Gray, court's do 
not wish to encourage officer's to take the path of least 
resistance with respect to searches: 
"Moreover, to rule otherwise would penalize the over-cautious 
officer for his or her attempts to secure a warrant and would 
encourage officers to use the path of least resistance, that is, to 
conduct an inventory search in every case without attempting to 
first secure a search warrant. Such result would be clearly 
contrary to our justice system's preference for warrants." Id. at 
1221. 
The officers in this case had possession of defendant's 
vehicle and keys because an automobile accident had occurred. 
Because there was no statutory basis for an impound at that point 
in time and because there was particularized suspicion of criminal 
activity, the officers should not have taken the "path of least 
resistance", but should have obtained a warrant. 
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EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES, JUSTIFYING 
A WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE 
DID NOT EXIST, AS THE VEHICLE HAD NO DRIVER 
Exigent circumstances, justifying a warrantless search of 
defendant's vehicle did not exist, because the vehicle had no 
driver. As indicated earlier in appellant's brief, the Supreme 
Court in State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 469 (Utah 1990) favors 
warrants under these circumstances: 
"As Justice Zimmerman explained in Hygh: "Once the threat 
that the suspect will injure the officers with concealed weapons or 
will destroy evidence is gone, there is no persuasive reason why 
the officers cannot take the time to secure a warrant. Such a 
requirement would present little impediment to police 
investigations, especially in light of the ease with which warrants 
can be obtained under Utah's telephonic warrant statute, U.C.A., 
1953, Section 7-23-4(2)." 
This approach was affirmed in State v. Anderson, 910 P. 2d 1229 
(Utah 1996). 
The police could have secured the vehicle and obtained a 
telephonic warrant. They did not need to summon the tow truck 
until after they had obtained a warrant and searched the vehicle. 
Therefore, no emergency existed. There was no danger that the 
evidence was going to be lost. The police simply failed to observe 
the basic constitutional mandate to obtain a warrant before 
searching private property. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress 
should be overturned, because the inventory search was not 
authorized by statute and was not justified under the facts and 
circumstances of this case. Law enforcement officers should have 
obtained a warrant as probable cause existed and there were no 
exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS ^JQ^dav of January, 1997. 
BARBARA KING LACHMAR 
Attorney for Defendant 
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